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I. INTRODUCTION 
Population growth in underdeveloped countries reached unprecedented 
levels during1he last two decades as a resuit of a rapid decline in mor­
tality rates. The present trend of demographic transition in these coun­
tries is different from the industrialized countries when they were at 
similar stages of development, where the decline In mortality rates more 
or less coincided with a reduction in natality. Also, the decline in 
mortality was much slower than what the underdeveloped countries are ex­
re­periencing. In underdeveloped countries, the crude birth rates have 
mained around forty per thousand, while slightly higher in Africa and the 
Middle East. During the last two decades the death rates have rapidly 
declined to around fifteen per thousand, resulting In an average annual 
population growth rate of 2.5 percent. 
At the same time, the present annual rate of population growth in 
industrialized countries is less than half of the population growth rate 
of the underdeveloped countries. The difference in popuiatlon growth has 
become so prominent between these two groups of countries that it ls often 
used as a criterium in order to distinguish the level of economic develop­
ment. Dudley Kirk drawing attention to the sharp dichotomy between the 
natality in developed and underdeveloped countries suggests that "natality 
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is itself perhaps the best single socio-economic variable distinguishing 
developed and less developed countries". 
1 J. Spengler also points out 
rate 
that gross reproduction /is below 2 in al I developed countries, and above 
2 in all the underdeveloped world which includes nearly al I African, Asian 
and Latin American countries. 2 
The rapid population increase in the underdeveloped countries has 
caused widespread concern. For example the Pearson Commission Report states 
that: 
"No other phenomenon casts a darker shadow over the prospect for 
international development than the staggering growth of population. 
It is evident that it is a major cause of the discrepancy between 
rates of economic improvement in rich and poor countries113 
The high rate of population growth presents a serious challenge to 
policy makers and planners in the underdeveloped countries. While the pro­
blem is more acute in high-density countries, the rapid increase in popu­
lation claims the modest gains in output everywhere and slows down the 
I. D. Kirk, "Natality in the Developing Countries: Recent Trends 
and Prospects", in S. J. Behrman et al., eds., Fertility and Family 
Planning: A World View. (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1963), p. 76. 
2. J. J. Spengler, "The Economist and the Population Question"', AER, 
March 1966, p. 15. 
3. Partners in Development, Report of the Commission on lnter­
national Development, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969) p. 55. 
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potential improvements in per capita incomes. During the last two decades 
the gross domestic product in underdeveloped countries increased by 
5 percent annually, but because of the 2.5 percent population growth the 
per capita income increase was I imlted to around 2.5 percent, a level 
wel I below the 3.6 percent per capita Income increase in the industrialized 
countries. 4 Also, it is broadly accepted that high rates of population 
growth impede development by adversely affecting the level of domestic 
savings, the composition of output, and the already severe unemployment. 
It is small wonder that the governments in no less than 30 countries have 
launched family planning programs in order to reduce the pressures origi­
nating from high ferti I ity. 
Concern over the so-cal led "population explosion" Is also evident In 
the more developed countries. Even though the population grows at a much 
slower rate and the pressures of population on resources is felt with 
much less intensity, the "world crisis in population" also concerns the 
public in developed countries- The legitimate outcry of the environmenta­
l i st certain I y does not rep resent the tota I source of concern. Present I y 
some 70 percent of the world population lives in the underdeveloped coun­
tries, and given the present rates of population growth, this ratio wi II be 
no less than 75 percent by the turn of the century. ! f h1gh fert ii ity 
proves to be detrimental to the improvement of existing I iving standards, 
it may present a serious cha! lenge to the social and political stability 
4. Ibid, p. 55. 
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in the world. The policy makers in countries with higher material stan­
dards are concerned about the potentiai problems that may arise in a 
world community whose members are getting relatively poorer. This kind of 
consideration urged the governments of these countries and the inter­
national bodies where the rich countries are dominant to mobilize their 
resources in curbing the rapid popuiation growth in poor countries. 
Despite this understandable concern over the population issue, present 
knowledge of the causes of differential fertility is sti I I in its infancy. 
It is only during the last ten or fifteen years that economists have shown 
genuine interest In the interaction between the socio-economic and demo­
graphic factors. However, in a relatively short period of time an im­
pressive list of studies has been compiled in the West exploring the im­
pact of such variables as income, urbanization and education on the fer­
tility behavior of families. The studies on this subject have basically 
covered the more developed countries. Insufficient data has discouraged 
similar studies in underdeveloped countries where the need is actually 
greater. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between 
various socio-economic variables and ferti tity in Turkey. Total fertility 
and chi Id-woman ratios have been taken as the dependent variables and 
their relationship with the level of income, education, urbanization and 
industrialization have been explored. It would be appropriate here to 
outline briefly the state of our knowledge on the question we are dealing 
·with before going into the detailed discussion of the methodology employed 
and the findings of the study. 
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11. A SUMMARY SURVEY OF THE ECONOMICS OF POPULATION 
Malthus' views on population Influenced the economic thinking on the 
role of the population throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
This is not to say that those who wrote on population during this period 
always agreed with Malthus' prediction that the world population increas­
ing geometrically would outstrip food supplies which increase only by ad­
dition. But the economists centered their arguments around the issue of 
whether the fixed supply of land was a limiting factor particularly In view 
of the impressive Increases In yields as a result of technological improve­
ments, or whether the notion of optimum population (which suggests that 
there is an optimum combination of and and resources after which the re­
turns to labor would diminish) was relevant or not. 
It was after 1930, according to J. J. Spengler, that the body of econo­
mic thinking on the population issue was diverted from its Malthusian 
base. 5 In the 1930's economists became concerned with the issue of 
whether the populations In the Western countries would become stationary 
or even decline. The idea that rapid population growth would be condu-
cive to economic growth via increased demand for consumption and/or in­
vestments was popularized in this era by the stagnationlst authors. Mean­
while, the so-cal led "Malthusian traps" seemed to be losing its appeal 
on account of an observable decrease in the estimated share of land and 
natural resources in economic growth compared with the share of capital 
accumulation and technological change. 
5. J. J. Spengler, 21!.· cit., p. 6. 
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But since the end of the Second World War revolutionary changes have 
taken piece In the pattern of population growth particularly in the under­
developed countries. There has been a revival of interest among the 
economists on the population issue as a result of this development. Never­
theless, save the exceptions of H. Liebenstein 1s6 and R. Nelson 1s7 attempts 
to incorporate population growth into theory, the numerous growth models 
that have been developed throughout this period remained surprisingly 
aloof towards the population phenomenon. And most economic models which 
attempted to incorporate the demographic factors treated population as an 
exogenous variable, losing much of their realism by not taking into ac­
count the fact that the demographic variables themselves are affected by 
socio-economic variables. Despite a growing body of literature on the 
Interrelationship between economic and demographic factors, there are 
gaps and deficiencies In present knowledge on the topic. The present 
situation ls summarized as fol lows in a recent United Nations report: 
"Although an integrated theory and empirical approach to the 
study of economic-demography ls urgently needed, the current 
state of knowledge is neither sufficiently unified or compre­
hensive enough to infer with confidence the precise causes of 
various demographic events or their consequences of population 
trends". 8 
6. H. Liebenstein Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, (New 
York: John WI ley and Sons, 1957). 
7. R.R. Nelson, "A Theory of Low-Level Equi I ibrium Trap in Under­
developed Countries", AER, December 1956. 
8. United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Pro­
grammes in Demographic Aspects of Economic Development, 1970, p. 13. 
It has been cu stoma ty ;- c c I i.,ss i f y various mode Is dea I i ng with the 
economics-demography issu0 in-ro the broad ca-i·egoric;s of macro economic and 
micro economic approaches. t-1acro economic models study the interaction 
between population on one hand and the key rn.:1cr·o economic magnitudes on 
the other, such as output, consumption, savings and employment. One such 
macro economic modei in which popuiation plays a central role is the wel I­
9
known Coale and Hoover model, based on indian experience. This model pro­
vides a framework by which the econor,1ic impact of lower fertl I ity can be 
measured. The underlying assui;ip"i"ions o·r the model ar-e ·that the size of 
the labor force rnmained constant during the period under study, the qual­
ity of the I abor fo1--ce is not affected by the increased per capita con­
sumpt Ion, and only the monotlzed investments are taken into account. The 
authors demonstrated that per capita incomes should be expected to increase 
in less developed countr;es through iol-'10:-ed fo,·ti I ity, because the "wel­
fare expenditures 11 n0c0ssitai·ed by lower· for·ri i ity would al low a larger 
portion of the total ou-1-ptr!· to be lnves·,-ed in g.-owth promoting capital 
goods and thus st 1mu iate economic growth. They shov,ed that for a thirty 
year perlod--from 1956 -;-o !936--the pe, capita income of India would grow 
by 95 percent with Ic•:1 pcpu I at: on groi·:th. 
The Coale and Hoove:-- n,0del is cs:---;-aln!y ;:rn lrn;-irovement over the more 
simplistic Har-rod-Do~.ni· mc.idc! 1.vherc gro•.v·l-h in ou-~ptr1· is a function of In­
vestment on I y, cmd the c-::ird-rl but ion of I at.~ot~ "i'o output is total I y ignored 
~- A, J. Coa!o <.1nd E. M. Hoover·, Popuia"!-icn Grm1th and Economic 
Development in Lmv-income C0ur.rries, (PrTncff:·c:1: F':-inceton University 
Press, 1958). 
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on the assumption that capital is the only scarce factor and labor is so 
abundant that its marginal productivity is zero or near zero. The major 
improvement In the Coale and Hoover model is that increases In population 
influence the aggregate output through its effect on savings and the pattern 
of Investments. However, the Coale and Hoover model also implies the con­
stancy of the capital-output ratio where increases in employment is a 
function of the capital invested and thus demographic variables do not 
directly Influence output. This is not a real lstic assumption particularly 
from the long term growth point o-f view of the economies. 
In an attempt to overcome this deficiency, macro economic models have 
been constructed on basically neo-classlcal I ines where both capital and 
labor are assumed to contribute to the growth of output. A production 
function of the Cobb-Douglas type with two factors, capital and labor, 
constitute the crux of these models. The increases in output is propor­
tionate to a certain power of the capital and labor factors, where the ex­
ponents represent the elasticities of productivity of the factor involved. 
11'\ 
S. Enke's recent work is representative of this approach. ,u The model 
constructed by Enke includes a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
along with an employment function I inked on one hand with the rate of in­
vestment and with the ava i Iab I e unemp toyed I abor on the other. The I eve Is 
of net Investments and savings are estimated residually, once the level of 
of consumption is determined by the level of income and the population 
10. S. Enke, Population Growth and Economic Development: Background 
and Guide, Prepared for U.S. AID by Tempo, General Electric's Center for 
Advanced Studies, Santa Barbara, California, 1968. 
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growth. Then the model is solved under the two separate assumptions of 
constant fertility and declining fertility. The solution based on de-
clining fertility results in slower population growth, a significant de­
cline in the child-adult ratio, a significant increase in per capita gross 
while there Is hardlynational product and in total savings by the year 2000, 
any difference in the absolute level of gross national product. 
The major shortcomings of both of these basically macro economic ap­
proaches as represented by the Coale and Hoover and the Enke models stem 
from their relatively simplistic, mechanical and one-sided nature. Macro 
eco'nomic models tend to oversimplify the interrelationship between the 
economic and demographic factors which is essentially a complex one. They 
totally disregard the behavioral aspects of this relationship and concen­
trate on the mechanics of how lowered fertility affects the growth in 
total output through its impact on consumption, savings and investments, 
assuming that aggregate production functions explain long term growth 
prospects for underdeveloped countries. Hoover suggests that in order to 
improve the real ism of these economic-demographic models some measure 
of investment in "human capital" and technology should be included in the 
production functions along with the inputs of labor and capital as wel I as 
attention being paid to the economies of scale resulting from large popu-
1 1 1at ion s I ze • 
It should also be noted that the present macro economic models pri­
marily emphasize only one aspect of the interaction between the demographic 
11. E. M. Hoover, "Basic Approaches to the Study of Demographic 
Aspects of Economic Development, Economic-Demographic Models", Report 
prepared for the U.N. Conference on the Demographic Aspects of Economic 
Development, 1970, pp. 9-12. 
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and economic variables, nameiy the impact of reduced fert! I ity over the 
key macro ~conomlc magnitudes, and often restrict their attention to only 
a few variables such as consumption, savings and per capita income. It is 
an established fact that human fertl i ity itself is affected by socio­
economic factors such as change in income, educational improvement, urbani­
zation and industrialization. This is actually the point of departure 
for the recently popular micrn economic a!Jproach to the economics-demo­
graphy phenomenon. 
With the so-called micro economic analysis, the reproductive behaviour 
of couples In response to changes in the ii- socio economl c environment Is 
evaluated. At the same time: -t-he consequences of ferti I ity changes are ex­
plored In terms of family con[ump·rion standards, saving patterns and labor 
force participation as wol I as how additional population pressure affects 
the behaviour of the couples. 
A pioneer o-f the micro economic cpprnach was H, Liebenstein. He dis­
cussed the uti I !ty derived from having children and the costs involved in 
I ':> 
rearing children.''" Liebenstein identified three types of utilities ac-
crued to the parents, as a r,Jsult of first, a chi Id being a "consumption 
good11 (because 1t is a source of personal pleasur-e), second, "productive 
agent", and third, a 11 po-J-eni"ial source of securii"y 11 • On the other hand he 
separated the cost of having an addltion,11 chi Id into direct and indirect 
costs; direct cos-rs being -:-h3 "conventional expenses 11 of maintaining the 
12. H. Leibenstein, 9p_. cit., p, 16 ! . 
chi Id and indirect costs referring to the "opportunities foregone" by 
having an additional chi Id. Leibenstein maintained that the correlation 
additionalbetween the level of income and the utility derived from an 
child as a productive agent and a potential source of security was negative 
while the relationship between hcome level and satisfaction from ~hi ldren 
was indeterminate. Regarding cost, he suggested that both direct and 
indirect costs of raising children increased as per capita income increased. 
In 1960, G. Beck,.3r applied the conventional economic theory of con­
sumer behavior in a rigorous fashion to the ferti I ity behavior of the 
13
households. According to Becker, lithe theory of the demand for the con-
sumer durables is a use-ful framewcrk in analyzing the demand for chi ldren
11 
since children provide "uti I ityn as consumer durables. Like other consumer 
durables, some children are of "higher· quaiity", not because they are 
superior but because -;-he amount of money spent on them is relatively higher. 
Becker maintains tha-t since children are n:)t inferior goods, the demand 
theory te I Is us that an increase in i nco~.19 shou Id increase both the quanti -
ty and the qua I i ty of chi I dren demanded. He thinks that Ue berste in erred 
when he said that the cost of children rises as the parents' income increases. 
According to Becker an increase in expenditure on children does not 
it means that parentsnecessarily mean a rise in the cost of c~i ldren, but 
prefer "higher qua I i ty" chi l d ren. It is not the cost but the qua Ii ty of 
children that goes up as income increases. As far as the supply of children 
13. G. Becker, 11 An Ecoi1omic Analysls of Ferti I ity", in Demoqraphlc 
and Economic Change in Developed Countries, P, Conference of the Univer­
(Princeton: Prince­sities-Nati ona i Bureau Commii"t•33 for· Economic Resear·ch, 
ton Univ. Press, i960) pp. 209-231 .. 
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is concerned, Becker-argued that fami I ies tend to have "excess children" 
because of a lack of contraceptive knowledge. Given perfect knowledge of 
contraception, couples would choose to have a number of children based on 
the same principles that apply to the theory of demand tor consumer 
durables. 
R. Easterlin, in a 1969 article, continued where Becker left off and 
argued that "tertl I ity behavior is the result of household choices, in 
which resources are weighed against preferences". 
14 He suggested that 
Income, tastes and prices are the bui Iding blocks of the study of the 
household behavior, and maintained that the "permanent income" concept 
is more pertinent to household decision-making than the observed income 
at a given time. The term permanent income is also defined as the potential 
income of the household. Given the potential income of a family, what de­
termines the demand tor children, he says, is the "structure of preferences" 
regarding goods, chi idren, leisure and fertll lty control practice. On the 
other hand, experience, and past and current environment are instrumental 
in shaping the structure of preferences. Easterlin suggests that a third 
relevant factor, after permanent income and the structure of preferences 
is the various "price constraints", such as the prices of chi Id care and 
of ferti I ity control methods relative to the prices of other goods. 
Easterlin does not agree with Becker's explanation of how the lack of 
contraceptive knowledge affects the supply of children. According to 
14. R. Easter I in, "Toward a Socio-Economic Theory of Ferti I ity: A 
Survey of Recent Research on Economic Factors in American Ferti I ity", 
in S. J. Behrman et al, eds., 2£..· cit., pp. 127-156. 
Easterlin the couples weigh the disuti lity of having an unwanted child 
against the cost involved infertility control, including the subjec­
tive cost. On account of this consideration the modern contraceptive 
methods are more attractive than the traditional ones, not only because 
they are more efficient but also because their subjective cost is con­
siderably lower. 
These pioneering works on the theory of fertil lty behavior have stimu­
lated empirical studies exploring the relationship between economic and 
social variables, and demographic variables. In some studies the relation­
ship between fertility and various measures of income was investigated. 
In one such study, D.S. Freedman found that potential Income was more in­
fluential on fertility than current income. 15 R. Freedman and L. Coombs 
showed that increases in income might encourage the demand for children, 
but "other reasons for not having children also increase with higher 
economic status". 16 J. Blake showed that as the money income increased, 
17
the "indirect costs" of raising children also increased. The findings 
of these studies generally supported the view that rising incomes en­
couraged fertility but at the same time increases in the cost of raising 
children adversely affected ferti iity. 
As the foregoing shows, theoretical models and empirical studies 
of micro economic nature gained prominence during the last decade. These 
15. D.S. Freedman, "The Relation of Economic Status to Fertility", 
AER, June 1963. 
16. R. Freedman and L. Coombs, "Economic Considerations in Faml ly 
Growth Decisions", Population Studies, Nov. 1966, p. 213. 
17. J. Blake, "Income and Reproductive Motivation", Population 
Studies, 1967. 
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studies approach the population problem at the family level and attempt to 
determine the impact of economic variables on the ferti I ity behavior of 
the married couples. They represent important strides forward in the state 
of knowledge in this field compared to ten years ago. Nevertheless a 
number of questions remain unanswered or not sufficiently explored. One 
such area is the lack of comprehensive models bridging the gap between 
the macro and the micro approaches. The incorporation of the micro 
findings with the macro models would increase the realism of these models 
considerably. 
Secondly there has been a heavy reliance on purely economic factors 
in these studies. As shown in the examples above, the relationship between 
income and fertility has been the center of attention. However, social 
factors may be equa I I y important in the determination of fert i I i ty be­
havior. Even though factors such as education, urbanization, industriali­
zation are often cited as relevent in the fertility discussions, their 
ful I impact has not so far- been properly dealt with. A much needed com­
prehensive approach would require the recognition of these factors alto­
gether. 
Thirdly, the present theoretical models have been developed to ex­
plain the population phenomenon in the [ndusi"ria!ized countries. Within 
this framework the treatment of children as consumer durables is appealing. 
But for a theory of fert i I ity behavior tc have uni versa I va I ue, it must 
take into account the socio economic conditions prevailing In the under­
developed countries. Liebenstein 1s eot-1 ier contribution that children are 
not only consumer durables, but also productive agents and potential sources 
of security is certainly relevant In poor countries. 
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A simi tar criticism also applies to the empirical studies carried 
out on this subject. These studies are often based on the experience and 
data of the industrialized Western countries. Thus the applicability of 
the findings of these studies is very limited. The paucity of reliable 
data Is certainly the major factor contributing to the lack of similar 
studies for the underdeveloped countries. Studies of this nature require 
the availability of detailed Information on a number of variables and with 
the exception of a few countries this Is not possible at present But it 
is in these very countries that the need for an understanding of fertility 
behavior is most urgent so that appropriate policies can be'brmulated 
and implemented. 
The fol lowing explores the socio-economics of fertility within the 
Turkish context. Needless to say, the analysis Is constrained by the 
limited data in many instances. Pt this stage, however, it would be appro­
priate to give some information on the socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the Turkish population. 
Ill. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DE~OGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
Turkey has a population of 35.7 mi II ion according to the preliminary 
results of the 1970 census. Turkey's population grew at an annual rate of 
25.5 per thousand during the 1965-70 period. The rate of population growth 
has fluctuated in the past; from nearly 2 percent in 1935-40, it dropped 
to almost I percent during the Second World War years, but due to rapid 
lowering of mortality immediately after the War, growth rates jumped to 
2.2 percent in 1945-50, to 2.8 in 1950-55 and 2.9 percent in 1955-60 before 
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it slowed down around 2.5 percent in the 1960-65 period. The lower growth 
rates in the sixties are not attributable to the slowing down of the fertl 1-
ity. It is the result of the changes in the age distribution of the 
popula~on--i.e., women entering the chi Id bearing age who were born in the 
low growth rate period of 1940-45--and migration due to increased job op­
portunities in Western Europe. 
The characteristics of Turkey's population are summarized in Table 
18based on the results of the Turkish Demographic Survey 1966-67. The 
figures given are both for Turkey as a whole and for rural and urban popu­
lations separately. As the data in Table I reveals, there is a marked 
difference in size between the rural and urban populations In most cate­
gories. At present, more than 65 percent of the Turkish people live fn 
scattered vi I I age-type settlements or in smal I towns, and the remaining 
35 percent live in towns and the cities with a population of 2,000 or more. 
The population of the cities increased by more than 5 percent annually 
throughout the i960 1s. This, has not been the result of a higher birth 
rate in the cities, bu rather because of migration from the vii !ages to 
the cities. Along with the phenomenon of city-bound migration, there has 
also been an east to west movement of population in Turkey. Despite com­
paratively lower birth rates in the Western provinces, more than two thirds 
of the Turkish population live in the Western part of the country, where 
the soi I is more fertile and the level of inaustrial ization is· higher. 
18. Vital Statistics from the Turkish Demographic Survey, 1966-67, 
School of Public Health, Ankara, 1970. 
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Table I 
Vital Statistics for Turkey 
Turkev Rural Urban 




Dependency Ratio (percentage) 
Proportion of Married Women 
(15-64) (percentage) 
Median Age
Medi an Age at Fi rst Marr· i age 
Male 
Female 
Women of Childbearing Age 
(15-49) (percentage) 
Crude Birth Rates (per thousand) 
Crude Death Rates " 11 
Natura I Increase " n 
Total Fertility 
Gross Reproduction Rates 
Mean Childbearing Age 
Chi Id-Woman Ratio (percentage) 




Expectation of I ife at Birth 
42.5 39.7 39.7 
53.3 51.9 56.2 
4.2 4.1 4.1 







21.2 20.2 22.9 
18. 3 18.3 18.5 
22.8 22.2 24.0 
39.6 43.9 31.4 
14. 6 16.7 10.7 
25. 0 27.2 20.7 
5.30 6.12 3.88 
2.62 3.01 1.94 
29.3 29.7 28.4 
71 .3 77.3 60.8 
14.6 16.1 II. 9 
18.7 20.9 14.7 
20.3 22.6 16. I 
54.9 52.8 58.6 
Source: Turkish Demographic Survey 1966-67. 
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One str·iking, though not surprising characteristic of the Turkish 
population is -rhe high percentage of children. Children under 15 consti­
tute some 42.5 percent of the total populati"on. according to the Turkish 
Demographic Survey, as shown In Tab I e I. As a resu It of higher popu Iat! on 
growth rates in recent decades, the share of this young age group has re­
latively increased. Acco1-ding to the census results in 1945, it was 39.5 
percent, in 1950 38.3 per·cent, in 1955 39.4 percent, In 1960 41.3 percent 
and in 1965 it was 41.7 percent. Such an age distribution, despite the 
low percentage of· those over 65 resu I ts in high dependency ratios; It is 
defined as the ratio between the non-working age and working age popula­
tions and is 87,6 pe:-ceni- for Turkey. The difference between the dependency 
ratios for rural nnd urban areas is also significant, it being as high as 
92.7 percent in rural vi I I ages against 77.9 percent for the cities. 
There are also dif-ferences between the rural and urban areas in terms 
of the median age, proportion of married women and median age at first 
marriage, as shown in Table lo Both the median age as a whole and the 
median age at first marriage for ma I es and fema Ies are I ewer for the rura I 
areas compared with the cities. On the other hand, the proportion of 
married women Is higher in the vi I Iages. 
It is a I so revea I ed in Tab I e I, that tlB crude birth rates for the 
whole country is nearly 40 per thouscnd, and the crude death rates are 
around 15 per thousand. Nearly 150 out of 1000 children die before they 
reach t-h0 age -:,f one, E>~pectation of I ife at birth is approximately 55 
years. 
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Total fertl lity rate, defined as the total number of children that 
would ever be born to an average woman throughout her reproductive life-­
The rate varies between 6.82 forbetween the ages of 15 and 49--is 5.3. 
the rural and 3.88 for the urban populations. On the other hand, the gross 
reproduction rate, which is the number of girls to an average woman in 
her reproductive ages, is 2.62 for Turkey. 
According to the 1965 census, only 48.7 percent of the Turkish popu­
lation over 6 years of age ls literate. The literacy level for the male 
populaTion was 64 percent as against 32.8 percent literacy for the female 
population. There is an appreciable difterence between the city and 
vii lage literacy levels; 66,9 percent for the cities and 38.5 percent for 
the villages. Provinces also differ significantly in terms of I iteracy 
levels. For example while some 77.3 percent of the people are literate 
In the province of Istanbul, only 17,6 percent are literate In the South­
Eastern province of Hakkari. 
Those who graduated from at least a five-year primary school are 
approximately 35 percent of the population eleven years old or over. 
Some 83 percent of primary school age children are attending schools at 
present, but the ratio drops to abouT 25 percent at the secondary level. 
The present size of the labor supply is approximately 15 mil lion in 
Turkey, and is growing at a rate of 3 percent annually. According to 
figures given by the State Planning Organlzation 
19 only 13.2 ml I lion or 
19. 1971 Annual Programme, Offtctat Gazette, Table 426. 
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88 percent of these are domestically employed. Another 500,000 work abroad 
mainly In West Germany. Some 68 percent of the domestically employed labor 
is engaged in agricultural activities, about I I percent work in industry, 
and the remaining 21 percent find employment in construction and in various 
services. 
Per capita gross national product of Turkey was 230 U.S. dollars in 
1970 at the official rate of exchange. The same year,some 30 percent of 
the net domestic income originated from agriculture, while the share of 
industry and services stood at 20 and 50 percent respectively. Marked 
disparities exist in personal and regional income distribution. According 
to a study conducted by the State Planning Organization, in 1963, 20 per­
cent of the families which made up the lowest income group had a 4.5 
percent share of the national income, while the share of the highest 
20 percent income group was as high as 57 percent. Looking at it from a 
different angle, per family income was 278 dollars for the first group and 
3.544 dollars for the latter group. 
20 On the other hand the level of 
living is markedly different between the large cities and rural areas, 
as well as between the Western and Eastern provinces. For example, per 
capita income of Istanbul province is more than eight times as high as 
Blng81 province in Eastern Anatolia. 
20. Second Five Year Development Plan 1968-72, State Planning 
Organization, Ankara 1968, p. 63. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The multivariate analysis has been widely used in studies exploring 
and measuring the impact of various socio economic variables on the fer­
tility behavior of families. In these studies the dependent variable is a 
certain measure of fertility (i.e. total fertility, gross reproduction 
rate or the chi Id-woman ratio) and the independent variables are those 
factors that are expected to influence the fertl lity behavior, such as 
level of income, industrial lzation, education, and urbanization. 
Depending on the nature of the analysis both time series and cross­
section analysis can be employed in these studies. The advantage of the 
time series analysis originates from the dynamic nature of the problem. 
One of the more important questions in the fertility analysis is how the 
changes in the socio-economic mi lieu affect the fertility behavior of 
the families. However, such an analysis requires data for a number of 
variables over an extended period of time. It Is generally very 
difficult to obtain consistent and reliable time series data for these 
variables, particuiariy in the iess deveioped countries. 
It is relatively easier to gather data for cross-section analysis. 
With this approach data is collected for· a number of variables for a 
number of countries or for different regions of a given country for a 
given year, with a view to measure the impact of these factors on fertil­
ity. Exclusion of certain variables describing the differences in re­
ligions, cultural heritage, and values in different countries may ad­
versely affect the realism of studies that draw on the experience of a 
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large number of countries. However, this problem becomes much less 
formidable in the cross-regional or provincial studies in a single 
country, since the population is usually more homogeneous from the cul­
tural point of view. 
The present study is an application of the cross-section analysis to 
the Turkish data, with the purpose of exploring the significance of a num­
ber of socio-economic variables In the determination of fertility behavior. 
Originally data was collected on 16 variables for the 67 provinces of 
Turkey for the year 1965. The year 1965 was chosen because this was the 
most recent population census year for which detailed information was 
available. After a number of trial runs the 16 independent variables were 
reduced to 7 in the final analysis. 
Two multiple regression problems have been worked out. In the first 
problem the total fertility and in the second problem the child-woman 
ratio was taken as the dependent variables, and all other variables were 
treated as the independent variables. The reason why the total fertility 
ls chosen as the dependent variable is self-explanatory. The child-woman 
ratio is also considered an adequate measure of the fertility behavior of 
couples
21 • 
For the solution of the two multiple regression problems, the computer 
program of Stepwise Regression was employed. The mechanics of this program 
has been explained in the general description: 
21, The generally accepted definition of the chi Id-woman ratio is 
the ratio between children ages Oto 5, and women 15-45 age group. However, 
in this study the 0-9 age group children has been used instead for the 
0-5 group, on account of greater age misreporting for the group in 
the Turkish censuses. 
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"This program computes a sequence of multiple I inear regression 
equations in a stepwise manner. At each step one variable ls added 
to the regression equation. The variable added is the one which 
makes the greatest reduction in the error sum of squares. Equiva­
lently, it ls the variable which has highest partial correlation 
with the dependent variable partialed on the variables which have 
already been added; and equivalently it is the variable which, If 
it were added, would have the highest F value. 1122 
The preliminary runs in the computer employing various combinations 
of variables have revealed that regression equation in the logarithmic 
form with the following independent variables produced the highest co­
efficient of determination (RSQ) and more consistent regression coefficients. 
where Y is either the total ferti lity
23 or the chi Id-woman ratio24 , x is1 
the education variable (the level of I iteracy or the ratio of female prl-
mary school graduates25 x2 is the relative distance from two Western pro-
vinces26 (istanbui or izmir}, x is the ievei of urbanization indicating3 
the ratio of those living in cities with more than 50,000 population to the 
27total population of the province, x is the level of industrialization as 4 
22. W. J. Dixon, BMD Biomedical Computer Programs, Univ. of Cali­
fornia Press, 1968, p. 233. 
23. Total fertility rates have been estimated Independently by F.C. 
Shorter of Princeton University, Office of Population Research. 
24. 1965 Population Census of Turkey 
25. Ibid 
26. Highway Map of Turkey, Turkey's Highways General Directorate 
27. 1965 Population Census of Turkey 
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28 x5indicated by the ratio of industrial labor to the total employment, 
ls the level of socio-economic developmen-r as indicated by a composite 
. d 29 X . t . . . 30 and x7 
.1s1n ex, 6 1s he 
population density per square kl lometer, 
the per cap1·ta .income. 31 
The results of the solution of the two regression problems are shown 
in terms of four problems. In the two solutions of the first problem the 
dependent vari ab Ie is the total fert i I i ty, and the education vari ab Ies 
are first the level of literGcy and second the ratio of female primary 
schoo I gradua·res. In the two so Iut ions of the second prob iem the dependent 
variable Is the chi Id-woman ratio, and ·rhe two educational variables are 
as explained above. 
Before analyzing the results ot this study, a few general observations 
should be made. In al I four probiems the coefficient of determination 
<RSQ) is very high and si·atistical ly significant. The lowest value of RSQ 
is 0.760 for problem #3 and the highest value is 0.847 for problem #2. 
On the other hand the educational variables (level of I iteracy and the 
ratio of female prirrnry school graduates) singlehandedly explain between 
63 and 72 percent of the variance in the tota I fert i I i ty and the chi Id-
28. Ibid 
29. Socio-Economic Developmont lnde~< for Turkey on a Provincial 
Basis, State Planning Organization, June 1970 (mlmeo) 
30. 1965 Population C0nsus of Turk0y 
31. T. Bulutay and H. Ersel, Turi-dye Milli Gelirinin Iller, lmalat 
Sanayii Gelirinin Ucret ve Kar Arasinda B81Unusll f.'2::erine Bir Deneme, 
Journal of Political Sciences Faculty, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1970. 
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Table 2. Ferti I ity Regress ions 
A. Level of Literacy as Education Variable 
Coefficient Standard t Value RSQ Increase 
Error in RSQ 
Constant 2.698 
Literacy -0.283 0.073 3.877 0.643 0.643 
Distance 0.062 0.013 4.769 0.786 0.143 
Industrialization -0.123 0.051 2.411 0.796 0.010 
Urbanization 0.012 0.005 2.400 0.819 0.023 
Density -0.031 0.040 o. 775 0.821 0.002 
Socio-Economic De-
velopment 0.047 o. 114 0.412 0.822 0.001 
Per capita income 0.017 0.087 o. 195 0.822 0.000 
B. Female Primary School Graduates as Education Variable 
Constant 2.115 
Graduates -o. 170 0.032 5.313 0.697 0.697 
Distance 0.054 0.01 I 4.909 0.810 o. 113 
Density -0.059 0.034 I. 735 0.824 0.014 
Urbanization 0.010 0.005 2.000 0.833 0.009 
Industrialization -0.110 0.046 2.391 0.843 0.010 
Socio-Economic 
Development 0.098 0.081 1.209 0.847 0.004 
* Per Capita Income 
*F level insufficient for inclusion 
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Table 3. Chi Id-Woman Ratio Regressions 
A. Level of Literary as Education Variable 
Coefficient Standard t Value RSQ Increase 
Error in RSQ 
Constant 1.124 
Literacy -0.228 0.059 3.864 0.611 0.611 
Distance 0.047 0.01 I 4.272 0.739 0.128 
Urbanization 0.006 0.004 1.500 0.743 0.004 
Industrialization -0.076 0.041 1.854 0.755 0.012 
Density 0.013 0.033 0.394 0.758 0.003 
Socio-Economic 
Development 0.076 0.093 0.817 0.759 0.001 
Per capita income -0.036 0.071 0.507 0.760 0.001 
8. Female Primary School Graduates as Education Variable 
Constant 0.676 
Graduates -0.140 0.026 5.384 0.686 0.686 
Distance 0.039 0.010 3.900 0.780 0.094 
Urbanization 0.004 0.004 1.000 0.784 0.004 
Industrialization -0.064 0.038 1,684 0.790 0.006 
Socio-Economic 
Development 0.124 0.086 1.441 0.795 0.005 
Per capita Income -0.054 0.066 0.818 0.797 0.002 
Density -0.012 0.031 0.387 0.798 0.001 
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32 woman ratios. The regression coefficients and the standard error of es­
timates are given in Column I and Column 2 of Tables 2 and 3 respectively. 
The resultant values are shown in Column 3, and indicate that only less 
than fifty percent of the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the five percent level. It should also be noted that with the exception 
of per capita income and density variables, the t-values are relatively 
high. 
V. MAJOR FINDINGS 
A. Income and Fertility 
In any study of fertility, the impact of the level of or the increase 
in per capita income on fertility occupies central importance. The 
theoretical discussions centering around the influence of income on fertil­
ity behavior of couples have already been summarlezed and the findings 
of some of the empirical research, mostly based on the experience of the 
industrialized societies have been discussed. Research in underdeveloped 
countries on fert!!lty-lncome issue is scarce, due to the unava!!ability 
and the unreliability of the data. 
Those who have attempted to explore the Influence of the level of 
income on fertility behavior in less developed countries are quick to 
admit the difficulty involved in separating the partial effects of income 
changes from the overal I effects. In realityg detailed family income 
32. In order1o verify the strength of educational variables, trial 
runs were made removing the educational variables. In all cases the 
distance variable became the most significant explanatory variable, but 
the value of coefficient of determination dropped to below 70 percent. 
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statistics are necessary before the partial impact of income on fer­
tility can be measured with accuracy. Jn some studies, including the 
present one, other variables such as education appear to be more signifi­
cant than income in affecting the fert i I ity. However, it is wide I y ac­
cepted that the absolute level and the rate of growth of income is highly 
correlated with the so-cal led modernization variables such as education 
and urbanization, and the level of Income contributes to the Improvement 
of the factors that are instrumental In lowering the fertility rates. 
In a cross section regression analysis covering 37 countries I. 
Adelman found that the partial effect of Income on fertility was consis­
tently positive, for al I age groups. 
33 A simi tar conclusion was reached 
by R. Weintraub. 34 J. L. Simon after analyzing the results of these two 
studies and comparing them with the experience of industrialized coun­
tries, maintains that partial regression results are not relevant and 
what ls important is what he cal Is the llunconditional effect" of income 
on ferti I ity. He maintains that 11 in underdeveloped countries the uncon­
ditional effect of income on fertility is negative, even though its par­
tial effect (after abstracting from other operative variables) may well be 
positlve. 35 
33. I • Ade Iman, "An Econometric Ana I ys is of Popu Iat ion Growth", 
AER, June 1963, p. 320. 
34. R. Weintraub, 11The Birth Rate and Economic Development: An 
Emp i r i ca I Study", Econometrica, Oct. I 962. 
35. J. L. Simon, "The Effect of Income on Fertility", Population 
Studies, Nov. I969, p. 334. 
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Our analysis is inconclusive with regard to the partial effect of in­
come on the fertility pattern in Turkey. The regression coefficients are 
not significant at al I and the income elasticity is very low. What adds to 
the state of indeterminancy is the fact that the sign of the partial re­
gression coefficient is once positive and once has an F value too low for 
inclusion in the analysis, when the total fertility rate is taken as the 
dependent variable, and it is negative when the chi Id-woman ratio replaces 
the fertl lity variable. However in most of the trial runs the sign of the 
coefficient was positive. Thus in looking at the results one reaches the 
conclusion that the partial impact of per capita income differentials in 
Turkey Is not significant in any v1ay. 
In the study of the relationship between the level of income and 
fertility the distribution of income vdthin each province is also very 
important. Given the mechanical estimates for per capita incomes, the In­
come level of the bulk of the people in certain provinces may be consider­
ably lower than the per capita figure indicates, due to highly unequal 
income distribution. The income distribution problem, however, could not 
be taken into account in this study. 
It Is also important to note here that even though the partial im­
pact of income proves to be insignificant, per capita income level is high­
ly correlated with some modernization variables, indicating the overall 
strong impact. For example the correlation coefficient between the per 
capita Income and the literacy level is 66 percent, with female .primary 
school graduates it is 73 percent, and with industrialization is 88 per­
cent. 
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B. Education and Fertility 
The negative correlation between the level of education and ferti llty 
has been evidenced in the studies based on data both in underdeveloped and 
developed countries. For example, I. Adelman found that for al I age groups 
in underdeveloped countries the regression coefficient of birth rates with 
respect to education was always negative3~ Asimilar result was reached 
by K. Dandekar in a study based on data for forty nine underdeveloped coun­
tries. According to the results of a National Sample Survey in India, ap­
proximately 60 percent of i II iterate married people knew about contracep­
tion. This ratio was 78 percent among the primary school graduates and 96 
37percent for the university graduates . R. 8. Hughes found the same nega-
38
tive correlation between fertility and education. The relatively high 
correlation coefficient found In these studies supports the thesis that 
education depresses fertility levels. 
The repre=sive influence of education on fertility may be explained by 
at least four factors. One of them is that literacy and education help 
people learn about contraception. This point seems to be particuiariy re­
levant in the less developed countries. In more advanced countries where 
the level of I iteracy is 90 percent or moree:lucation may not be a signifi­
cant factor as far as knowledge of contraception is concerned. But in 
36. I • Ade Iman, QQ.. cit. , p. 322. 
37. K. Dandekar, "Effect of Education on Ferti I ity", in United 
Nations, World Population Conference. 1965, New York 1967, p. 149. 
38. R. 8. Hughes, "Human Ferti I ity Differentials: The influence of 
Industrial-Urban Development on Birth Rates", Population Review, July 
1959, p. 62. 
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underdeveloped countries with very high i I literate masses it is not un­
realistic to expect that lack of knowledge can conceivably be a factor 
contributing to high fertility. 
The relationship between education and the knowledge of contraception 
may also be looked at from a different angle. As discussed, Becker ar-
gued that the reason the number of children in a family differed from the 
preferred number was because couples lacked contraceptive knowledge. But 
R. Easterlin maintained that this was too simple an explanation and that 
for a complete analysis of ferti I ity behavior, the pr-eduction of another 
good--namely coitus--must be introduced into the analysis. Thus he says that 
couples consider the loss of uti I ity attributable to the possibi I ity of 
an unwanted birth against the uti I ity lost by using contraceptive methods. 
One can conclude from this that even when one assumes the masses have 
contraceptive knowledge, education increases the opportunities for a more 
effective use of it while lowering the subjective cost of fertility con­
trol. 
A second way education adversely affects fertility is that education 
may provide opportunities, particularly for women, that conflict with 
chi Id rearing. This is probably true for both developed and underdeveloped 
countries. Women with education have a wider opportunity to be gainfully 
employed outside the home, and in societies where chi Id-care facilities 
are either inadequate or non-existent chi Id rearing becomes an obstacle 
for economic advancement. 
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A third effect of education on fertility can be explained in terms of 
the general effects of education on human beings. Education provides a 
new outlook towards the world ,and makes people more conscious of his 
surroundings and opportunities. It makes them more .rational and trees 
them from tradition. 
A fourth factor may be the increasing cost of chi Id-rearing with 
educational level of parents. Even though the cost of children of similar 
quality is not different for educated and uneducated couples, as Becker 
pointed out in the discussion of income level and the cost of children, it 
Is true that the educated couple may want children of higher quality with: 
better education. Thus the high cost of rearing children may also be a 
depressing factor on ferti I ity among educated people" 
It is not surprising that the findings of the present study coincide 
with the general opinion that education is negatively correlated with 
fertility. But the results are rather overwhelming, Both I iteracy and 
female primary school graduates score very high in the analysis. In al I 
cases the sign of the education regression coefficient is negative. The 
coefficients are always statistically significant at five percent level. 
And the elasticities are relatively high. But more importantly, in al I 
cases education explains more than 65 percent of the variance in the de­
pendent variable, and the remaining factors combined explain approximately 
15 percent of the variance. Al I these strongly suggest that the relation­
ship between education and fertility is a causal one. It is also interesting 
to observe that the female primary school graduate variable seems to be 
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more important than the Ii ter-acy var i ab I e in exp I a in i ng the variance in 
fert i I i ty, indicating the rn ie of forma 1 education. On the other hand 
when the female primary school graduates variable is replaced by the male 
primary school graduate ratio as the educational vai-lable, the RSQ drops 
significantly. This suggests that the female education is more important 
than male education in lowedng the ferti ! ity rate. 
In a study of the re Iat ionsh i p between \I/omen's eciucat ion and fert i 1-
i ty, S. Timur found that average I ive births for i I! iterate women in Tur­
key was 4.2 while I iterate women without formal education had on the 
average 3.2 children, women 11/i-th prirr:ury schooi education had 2.8, with 
secondary education 2.0 and those wlth university ec!ucation had 1.4 
children. However she also found that husbandis education influenced fer­
ti I ity in a much less effective way and a break ln ferti I ity occurred 
39-' I I o f schoo I .Ing. 
The Turkish Demographic Survey revea!ed -;-hat birth rates varied ac­
cording to the education of the women. For example ln the most fertile 
age group, 20-24, the bi r-th rate among l ; I iterate women is 305 per thousand 
whereas the birth rate stands at 235 pet thousand among the primary school 
40 
on Iy at the seconaary eve 
graduates, and I 13 per thousand for the middie school graduates. 
39. S. Timur, "Socio-Economic Determinants o-f Differential Fer-
ti I lty in Turkey", lr.stituie cf Population Studies, Hacettepe University, 
Ankara, 1971, pp. il,14. (Mlmeo). 
40. Turkish Demographic Survey, op. cit. pp. 51, 54. 
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C. Urbanization, Population Density and Fertility 
Data from a large number of countries suggest that urban fertility 
rates are generally lower than rural fertility rates in both developed 
and underdeveloped countries. According to the Turkish Demographic Sur­
vey, the total fertility rate for urban Turkey (population 2,000 or more) 
was 3.88 and for rural Turkey 6. 12 for the survey period of 1966-67. Simi­
larly the crude birth rates also differed significantly in the cities and 
the vi I !ages, birth rates being 3.14 for urban and 4.39 for rural Turkey. 
A number of reasons have been given for the fertility differentials in 
the urban and rural populations, It has been argued that urban settings 
provide more economic opportunity and social freedom for women. In the 
cities, women are generally less dependent on men. It has also been argued 
that the cost of raising children is higher in the cities and people often 
consider cities a poor place to raise children. The addition of another 
ch 11 d to the fami !y in rura I areas does not increase the space requirements 
and various expenditures in the same proportion as it does in cities. And 
the value of children as productive agents is considerably less in the 
cities. Children help the families as labor from very early ages on farms 
whereas the opportunity to use them for any kind of labor is I lttle in 
the cities even in the poorest countries .. 
In this analysis the level of urbanization is defined as the ratio be­
tween the number of peopie living in cities with 50,000 population or more 
and the total population in a province. Other criteria for the level of 
urbanization have also been used in order to test the impact of urbanization 
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on ferti llty. The level of urbanization variables estimated on the basis 
of 2,000, 10,000 and 20,000 population or more produced statistically less 
significant coefficients and contributed lower values to the RSQ. 
Al I urbanization variables including the one used in the final analysis 
gave coefficients with relatively low values and with positive signs Indi­
cating that the level of fertility is very I ittle affected by urbanization, 
and whatever effect urbanization had on fertility, it was positively corre­
lated. This is contrary to the widely held belief that urbanization con­
tributes to the lowering of the ferti I ity. However, what Is observed 
here may be regarded as a temporary phenomenon. In Turkey, as in many other 
underdeveloped countries, migration from the rural areas to the cities 
gained momentum during the last two decades. Rapid increases in the birth 
rate have put a heavy strain on the already I imited resources and oppor­
tunities in the vii lages while increased use of machinery in the farmland 
has displaced men. Those who move to the cities often live in squatter 
settlements, without socially mixing with the city dwellers. In such a 
setting they adhere to the values, practices and outlook towards I ife 
which they brought from their rural background. It would be realistic to 
expect that as the time passes, the offspring of this generation, par­
ticularly with the aid of education, wi II have different values and dif­
ferent behavioral patterns, including fertility behavior. 
S. Timur also reached a similar conclusion with a different set of 
data on Turkey. She says that the city-ward migration did not Induce 
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lower fertility unless it was accompanied by a move towards higher socio­
. t t 41economics a us. 
The impact of population density on fertility has also been explored. 
Two considerations led to the inclusion of the density variables in this 
analysis. Firstly, it has been suggested elsewhere42 that the popula­
tion-resource ratio may exert some pressure on reproductive behavior. 
Admittedly population density may not reflect the actual resource availa­
bil !ties, but density is a close approximation particularly for countries 
like Turkey where more than 70 percent of the people derive their livel i­
hood from the land. Secondly, population density in a given province is 
an indicatior of how close the communities are geographically and shows 
the degree of possible social mobi I lty and contact. 
In this analysis the density coefficients in all four problems have 
had low values with relatively high standard errors. However, the density 
variable was negatively associated with fertility and child-woman ratios 
in three of the four problems. Thus, even though ferti llty Is slightly 
higher in provinces with a high level of urbanization, it is generally 
lower in more densely populated provinces. One or both of the above men­
tioned factors ought to be instrumental in explaining why fertility is 
lower in more densely populated areas. 
41. S. Timur, QQ_. cit., pp. 9-10. 
42. I. Adelman, 2Q.• cit., p. 318. 
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O. Industrialization and Fertility 
In the Western·countries' experience, industrialization, urbaniza­
tion, and lowering of the ferti I ity al I coincide with each other. This led 
many to expect the same pattern would repeat for the underdeveloped coun­
tries. As these countries are more industrialized and more urbanized 
societies the birth rates were expected to rapidly fal I. This analysis, 
however, reveals that even tor a transitional period, the type of urbani­
zation taking place in Turkey does not lead to an immediate decline in 
fertility, as already mentioned. 
As a measure of industrialization, the ratio of industrial labor to 
the total labor force was taken. In al I four problems the sign of the 
coefficient of the industrialization variable is negative and the t value 
is around two. This suggests that industrialization is associated with 
lower fertility. In a different problem the industrialization variable was 
replaced by another variable expressing the ratio of non-agricultural 
labor to total employment. The sign of the coefficient became positive and 
the coefficient itself became very insignificant. This reinforces the 
result arrived at with the urbanization variable. That is very large por­
tion of the non-agricultural labor force is made up of city dwellers who 
recently migrated from the vi 11 ages, and participate in service-oriented 
activities. 
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E. Distance from the West 
There is a marked difference in the level of I iving between the Eas­
tern and Western provinces of Turkey. In the East, which is less densely 
populated, per capita income, level of I iteracy, level of urbanization, 
and per capita industrial output are considerably lower compared with the 
Western part of the country. The existing regional disparities also have 
been recognized by the government, and reducing the regional gap became 
an explicit official tar§et of Turkey's five year plans. 
On the other hand fertility differentials are also evident in these 
different regions of the country. According to the results of the Turkish 
Demographic Survey, crude birth rates in 18 Eastern provinces averaged 
49.7 per thousand in rural areas and 47.9 in urban centers, whereas-the 
corresponding ratios for 14 Western provinces were 35.6 and 26.5 per 
thousand respectively. Obviously the lower fertility in the Western pro­
vinces is connected with the higher level of literacy and education as 
wel I as higher level of industrialization, income and urbanization in a 
direct or indirect way. Nevertheless, there could be another factor not 
covered by the above considerations, that might influence fertility be­
havior. After all, the population of Western provinces of Turkey have 
traditionally been in contact with the European populations and have been 
more strongly influenced by the values prevailing in these societies. 
These observations suggest the need for the inclusion of a factor, called 
the distance variable for practical purposes, representing the relative 
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distance for. each province from either Istanbul or lzmir--whichever is 
shorter--the two large western cities traditionally cultural and commer­
cial centers. 
The analysis showed that the distance variable proved to be an impor­
tant one explaining the variance in the dependent variable, only second 
to the education variable. Also in al I four problems the distance coeffic­
ient was significant at 5 percent level. Nevertheless, the value of the 
coefficients were smal I indicating the relatively low partial impact of 
the distance. As expected, in al I problems it was obvious that the fer­
tility and chi Id-woman ratios were positively correlated with the value 
of the distance variable. That is, the longer the distance from Istanbul 
or Izmir the higher the ferti llty was. 
F. Socio-Economic Development and Fertl lity 
At the time the present study was being conducted, a "synthetic" In­
dex of the level of socio-economic development of the provinces of Turkey 
was pubiished. 43 inciuded in this index were 22 variabies grouped undei 
four headings. The first group of variables described the level of indus­
trialization, the second group urbanization and organization, third group 
modernization in agriculture, and the fourth group the quantity of ser­
vices. Accordingly each province assumed an index value, based on a value 
of 100 for Turkey. In this index, the province ranking at the bottom of 
the list assumed a value of 35 while the value attached to the province 
at the top of the list was 377. 
43. Socio Economic Development Index for Turkey, op.cit. 
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The computations showed that the level of socio economic development 
variable had a relatively large partial impact on the dependent variable, 
but the standard error was too large for the coefficient to be statis­
tically significant at 5 percent level. On the other hand the sign of 
the coefficient was positive in al I cases showing that fertility and 
socio-economic development was positively correlated. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing analysis reveals the strength and significance of the 
relationship between various socio-economic variables and the fertility 
behavior of the population in Turkey. However, caution must be exercised 
in the interpretation of the findings of such a study. Strong inferences 
to the causal relationship would be unwarranted and misleading. Given 
the constraints and I imitations of such a study, the fol lowing pattern 
emerges from the analysis of the relationship between the socio-economic 
variables and the fertility in Turkey. 
Education in general, and female education in particular, seems to 
be the most important variable causing the ferti I ity differentials in 
various provinces of Turkey. The adverse relationship between literacy 
and female primary school graduates on one hand and the total fertility 
and chi Id-woman ratio on the other is so significant and consistent that 
one is led to believe that the relationship must be a causal one. It is 
plausible that education depresses fertility by helping individuals to 
learn about contraception and by providing opportunities that may conflict 
with chi Id-rearing as wet I as by affecting the values and overal I outlook 
of people towards I ife. 
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The relationship between the level of industrialization and ferti 1-
ity also seems to be an adverse one even though the coefficients were not 
statistically significant. Industrialization is expected to depress 
fertility by changing the entire pattern of I iving and expectations of the 
people. On the other hand, the level of urbanization, contrary to the 
expected, has proven to have hardly any impact on fertility, and more 
importantly, the relationship between the two variables was positive. The 
only plausible explanation to be given for this finding is that the type 
of urbanization taking place in Turkey, I ike in most underdeveloped 
countries, is not conducive to a rapid transformation of the values and 
life style of the people migrating to the cities. A majority of these 
migrants are employed in various services and the rate of unemployment runs 
high among them. They do not mix socially with other city dwellers and 
they I ive in squatter houses on the periphery of the larger cities. Under 
these circumstances it is understandable why the mere i11cldence of 
urbanization does not automatically produce lower fertility for at least 
a generation or so. 
The present analysis is inconclusive as far as the relationship be­
tween the level of per capita income and fertility is concerned. However 
it is necessary to make a distinction between the partial and overall im­
pact of the level of income. Even though the level of per capita income 
does not seem to have any significant partial impact on the fertility 
differentials among various provinces, it is very highly correlated with 
some modernization variables including literacy and formal education. The 
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level of I iteracy as wel I as the level of industrialization, both of which 
seem to have a depressing effect on fertility, are relatively higher in 
provinces with higher per capita incomes. 
Finally, the distance from the Western provinces of Turkey explains a 
surprisingly high percentage of the variance in the fertility data~ The 
farther the distance from the West the higher the fertility rate becomes. 
One explanation for this phenomenon is the fact that the population of the 
Western provinces have been historically in closer contact with the Euro~ 
pean communities mostly as a result of migration and have been influenced 
by the style of I ife and standards of these communities. 
It is appropriate here to pause to ask what such an analysis adds to 
our knowledge concerning the economics-fertility issue in underdeveloped 
countries. At the expense of repeating ourselves, it should be stated at 
the outset, that the relationship between the socio-economic factors and 
fertility is obviously a more complicated matter than can be explained by 
the few quantifiable variables selected here. And thus, the present analy­
sis should be considered a first step in the exploration of the underlying 
factors of the economics-fertility issue, instead of being conclusive. 
In addition, this type of analysis i I luminates the so-cal led "demo­
graphic transition 11 phenomenon. It is thought that the pattern of decline 
infertility rates following the decline in mortality rates, as occurred 
in West European countries during the previous century, will repeat itself 
in the present day underdeveloped countries, as these countries go through 
a period of increasing per capita incomes, industrialization and rapid 
urbanization. However, an important factor that often escapes the eye is 
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the fact that the decline in mortality rates in West European countries 
fol lowing the industrial revolution was the result of the transformation 
of the whole socio-economic system, whereas the relatively rapid decline 
in mortality rates in the underdeveloped countries, particularly since 
the Second World War, is attributable mainly to external factors such as 
the introduction of the practices of modern medicine and preventive health 
measures. Thus it may be misleading to compare the underlying factors be­
hind the decline in mortality In these two groups of countries. 
The findings of this study suggest that the impact of the so-called 
modernization variables, with the exception of education, is not very 
significant in depressing the fertility rates in a country like Turkey, 
at the present stage of economic development. Even though the static 
nature of this analysis does not al low us to predict the impact of the 
changes in the selected variables on terti !ity, throughout time, the 
relatively low level of the partial impact of per capita income differen­
tials, urbanization and even industrialization should justify the above 
conclusion. These findings do not support the view that a rapid demographic 
transition wil I take place in the underdeveloped countries, once these 
countries accelerate their economic growth associated with rapid urbani­
zation. The decline infertility rates in underdeveloped countries wi I I 
probably be realized at a slower pace than most people expect. It wi I I 
also require overwhelming changes in the attitudes, values and institu­
tions alongside with gains in per capita income. And the present study 
gives a clue that education may be the key variable in this process. 
